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 ABSTRACT 
Renewable electricity is pivotal to the medium and long-term reduction of 
Australia’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, if deep cuts in them are eventually 
implemented. This paper examines the effectiveness of the principal existing 
policies that could potentially promote the expansion of renewable electricity 
(RElec) in Australia: the expanded Renewable Energy Target (RET); the 
proposed emissions trading scheme (ETS); and the state and territory based 
feed-in tariffs. We find the effectiveness of RET is severely eroded by the 
inclusion of solar and heat pump hot water systems; by the inclusion of 
‘phantom’ tradable certificates; and by high electricity consumption growth. We 
also find that the ETS will not produce a high enough carbon price to assist most 
RElec technologies before 2020; and that most of the feed-in tariffs exclude 
large-scale RElec and will give little assistance to small-scale RElec because 
they are mostly net tariffs. Unless there is a major revision of its RElec policy 
mechanisms, Australia will fail to reach its renewable electricity target and in 
particular will fail to build up its solar generation capacity which could be a 
major source of future deep cuts in the country’s electricity generation 
emissions.  
(192 words) 
Keywords: Renewable energy target, emissions trading, renewable portfolio 
standard.  
Abbreviated title: Australian Renewable Electricity Limitations 
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Table 1: Abbreviations 
CCS Carbon capture and storage 
CPRS Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (proposed 
Australian emissions trading scheme) 
ETS Emissions trading scheme 
GHG Greenhouse gas or gases 
MRET Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (Australian 
RPS until 2009) 
PV Photovoltaic 
RElec Renewable electricity 
RECs Renewable Energy Certificates (MRET or RET 
tradable certificates) 
RET Renewable Energy Target (Australian RPS from 
2010) 
RPS Renewable Portfolio Standard 
  
1. Introduction 
Australia is the largest per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (see Table 
2). This is primarily due to the high percentage of coal (76%) in the fuel inputs 
to its electricity generation mix (IEA, website). Therefore, it could be argued 
that if Australia can achieve deep cuts in emissions from electricity generation, 
many other countries could emulate it. Electricity generated from renewable 
energy (RElec) is likely to be central to Australia’s ability to make deep cuts in 
its GHG emissions. The current generating costs of RElec are higher than those 
of conventional fossil-fuel electricity and different types of RElec have different 
generation cost differences with fossil-fuel generated electricity. So it will 
largely be the success, or otherwise, of RElec support mechanisms and their 
effect on bridging these generation cost differences that will determine the 
future of RElec in Australia. Of course, if the price of fossil-fuel electricity 
included its external (environmental, health and social) costs support 
mechanisms for the lower-cost sources of RElec would be unnecessary (Rabl 
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and Spadaro, 2000). Carbon taxes and emissions trading can be seen as a means 
of internalising (at least to some degree) the external costs. 
To date the major RElec support mechanism in Australia has been the 
modest Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET): a Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) mechanism which sought to boost the country’s RElec 
generation by 9.5 terawatt-hours per year (TWh/y) on 2001 levels by 2010. 
Sufficient RElec technology to reach the 2010 target was installed by 2006 and 
the boom in wind power, that had been driven by the target, ended. As a result, 
the new federal government implemented an expanded RPS – the Renewable 
Energy Target (RET) – comprising an additional 45 TWh/y of RElec by 2020 
(including the original MRET). The MRET and RET RPS mechanisms have 
government mandated levels of RElec purchase by electricity retailers which 
can be met through contracted purchases of RElec or through the purchase of 
tradable renewable energy certificates (RECs). 
Several commentators have examined the interaction of emissions trading 
and RPS mechanisms (Jensen and Skytte, 2003; Linares et al., 2008; Morthorst, 
2001). Others have examined the extent of global RElec resources and its 
implications for long-run RElec marginal costs (de Vries et al., 2007; Hoogwijk 
et al., 2004). Linares et al (2008, pp. 380, 382, 383) argue that, because RPS 
tradable certificate prices represent the difference between the perceived long-
run marginal cost of RElec and that of non-RElec electricity, an increase in non-
RElec electricity costs through emissions trading should lower the RPS tradable 
certificate price. However, they also argue that, if the size of the RElec market is 
large compared to that of the emissions trading market, the relationship can 
work in reverse: an increase in the tradable certificate price can lower the ETS 
Design Limitations in Australian Renewable Electricity Policy  December 2009    p. 4. 
carbon price. The examinations of global RElec resources broadly conclude that 
most regions of the world do not have an abundance of a full range of RElec 
types. This paper adds to this knowledge by considering a RPS mechanism that 
grows from being relatively small, compared to the proposed national emissions 
trading market, to being relatively large, in a country that is blessed with a wide 
range of significant RElec sources.  
Specifically, this paper evaluates (1) the medium-term effectiveness of 
emissions trading in stimulating RElec in Australia and (2) the potential 
stimulatory contribution of the expanded RET with reference to Australia’s 
availability of RElec resources and the unique design features of the mechanism. 
These aims are feasible, now that the shapes of the nation’s ETS and expanded 
RET are clear. The paper uses modelled forecasts of Australia’s emissions 
trading carbon price to predict what RElec stimulatory effect it will have in 2020 
and projects the likely 2020 mix of the RElec stimulated by the expanded RET. 
Section 2 discusses the role of RElec in achieving deep cuts in Australia’s GHG 
emissions; part of section 2 discusses a ‘diversified portfolio’ approach to RElec 
development in Australia. Section 3 considers the historical impact of the 
MRET on Australia’s RElec generation; section 4 discusses the possible effect 
of emissions trading on Australia’s RElec; section 5 examines the prospect of 
reaching the expanded RET target; and section 6 draws conclusions about the 
future of RElec in Australia.  
Throughout this paper several references are made to the pursuit of a 
‘diversified portfolio’ approach to RElec development . The portfolio approach 
to RElec development is similar to the portfolio approach to investment risk 
management: an investment theory pioneered by Markowitz (1959). Markowitz 
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argued the optimisation of investment return has to be balanced against the 
acceptance of risk to achieve a desired rate of return. He said a diversified 
portfolio will generally have a lower cost, compared to a narrow portfolio, 
because of its lower risk even if some components of it have a relatively high 
cost. In RElec planning terms, a diversified portfolio approach means 
stimulating a range of RElec types, not just the least-cost ones (hydro, wind and 
biomass) as RPS mechanisms are designed to do. Awerbuch (2006) argues 
energy planning needs to abandon its fixation with least-cost fuels through the 
development of diversified portfolios. In this paper the RElec concentration 
index is used as an indicator of whether a diversified portfolio approach is being 
pursued. The RElec concentration index is calculated using the Herfindahl 
concentration index: the sum of the squares of the market shares of the RElec 
types that make up a nation’s RElec portfolio. The Herfindahl index is often 
used to measure energy market concentration, for instance by the European 
Commission (2007). The higher the index, the more concentrated is the RElec 
mix. The index is widely used in competition analysis to determine if there is 
monopolistic or oligarchic behaviour: it is similar to the Simpson diversity index 
used in ecology. 
 
2. The role of renewable electricity in reducing Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions 
 
2.1 The need for deep cuts in Australia’s electricity greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Climate change is a high-profile issue in Australia. Eventually, Australia’s 
response to climate change is likely to require long-term deep cuts in its GHG 
emission entitlements. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, although 
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Australia is a small global emitter responsible for about 1.4% of global GHG 
emissions, it is one of the world’s highest per capita emitters and has the highest 
per capita emissions of any developed country (see Table 2). Its per capita 
emissions are about twice the OECD (unweighted) average and four times the 
global (unweighted) average (Garnaut, 2008 p.160). Secondly, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007 p. 23) calculates that, 
to contain human GHG emission-induced global temperature increases to no 
more than 2.4°C above pre-industrial levels, considered then to be a moderately 
safe level of warming, it will be necessary to reduce global emissions by 
between 50% and 85% on 2000 levels by 2050. The 2.4°C limit would require 
global GHG concentrations to stabilise at around 450 CO2e ppm. An Australian 
government climate change inquiry conducted in 2008 found that if the country 
were to make a proportionate contribution to this GHG stabilisation scenario, 
consistent with eventual convergence of global per capita GHG emission 
entitlements, it would have to reduce its 2000-01 level of emissions by 90% by 
2050 (Garnaut, 2008 p. 209). More recently, some leading climate scientists are 
recommending stabilisation at 350 ppm CO2e (Hansen et al. 2008) and many 
support short-term targets of 25–40% below 1990 level by 2020. 
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Table 2: Per capita non land-use GHG emissions of selected OECD 
countries, 2005 
Country 2005 per capita 
emissions: CO2e per 
person 
Australia 26.9 
United States 23.5 
Canada 22.6 
New Zealand 19.1 
Belgium 13.2 
Germany 11.9 
Greece 11.5 
United Kingdom 10.6 
Japan 10.5 
France 9.0 
Hungary 8.3 
Sweden 7.4 
Mexico 6.2 
 
Source: World Resources Institute, 2009. 
 
There are many areas where Australia could make major cuts in its GHG 
emissions, the most feasible are in electricity generation and use. Electricity is  
easier and less expensive to reform than other major sources of its emissions like 
agriculture and transport. It is also a prime target because electricity GHG 
emissions make up a larger proportion of Australia’s national GHG emissions 
than they do for any other OECD country. Electricity generation accounted for 
35.6% of Australia’s net GHG emissions in 2000, nearly twice the OECD 
(unweighted) average that year of 18.3% (IEA, 2009b; WRI, 2009). A large part 
of the reason for the high contribution of electricity generation to Australia’s 
GHG emissions is the high GHG intensity of its electricity supply. In 2000 each 
MWh of electricity emitted on average 0.863kg of CO2 – this was 2.4 times the 
OECD (unweighted) average that year of 0.354kg (WRI, 2009). 
The importance of major cuts in Australia’s electricity GHG emissions is 
heightened by the fact that, as shown in Figure 1, they were the fastest growing 
source of emissions between 1990 and 2007 and, under business-as-usual 
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conditions, are forecast to grow a further 40% between 2006 and 2020 (DCC, 
2008a p. 17). If a significant proportion of the nation’s transport is eventually 
provided by electric vehicles, there will be even faster growth in electricity’s 
emissions, unless all battery charging is restricted to RElec. 
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Figure 1: Australia’s non-land clearing greenhouse gas emissions, 1990 and 
2007 
Source: DCC, (2009b). 
The two main drivers of Australia’s high, and increasing, electricity 
generation GHG emission intensity are its significant dependence on coal for 
electricity generation and its relatively low use of RElec. In 2007 Australia was 
the second-most coal dependent OECD country for electricity generation. In that 
year coal – both black and brown (lignite) – supplied 76% of the country’s 
electricity generation compared to an OECD (unweighted) country average of 
37.3% (IEA website). (Poland had highest percentage with 93%). In 2006 
Australia’s use of RElec was significantly lower than the country average for the 
OECD. In that year 7.6% of Australia’s electricity generation was supplied by 
RElec compared to an OECD (unweighted) country average of 16.4% (IEA, 
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2009a). The disparity between the electricity share of RElec in Australia and 
other selected OECD countries is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: The percentage of electricity from RElec in select OECD 
countries, 2006. 
Source: IEA ( 2009b). 
 
2.2 The place of RElec in reducing Australia’s electricity greenhouse gas 
emissions 
There are two major ways in which the GHG emissions from Australia’s 
electricity supply can be reduced: one is through using electricity more 
efficiently, the other is by switching all, or part, of its electricity supply to low 
or zero emission sources. ‘Low emission electricity sources’ means gas (both 
natural gas and coal seam methane), nuclear power, or coal with carbon capture 
and storage (CCS), if the latter two eventually become commercially available 
in Australia. ‘Zero emission electricity’ means RElec such as wind, biomass, 
solar or hot rock (‘engineered’) geothermal, if the latter becomes commercially 
available. Hot rock geothermal exploits subterranean heat via water pumped 
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through drilled holes. (Hydro has very little potential for expansion in 
Australia).  
The attraction of using RElec for electricity generation is that it emits no 
GHG emissions during operation. By contrast, gas emits about half the 
emissions per unit of electricity generation that non-CCS coal does, and CCS 
technology, when and if it is ever commercially-ready, is likely to emit at least 
20% of the emissions of non-CCS coal generation technology. A further 
advantage of RElec is that it can be used now: CCS is unlikely to be 
commercially available before 2025 (Treasury, 2008 p. 125). The big 
disadvantage of electricity generated from renewable sources is that it is 
currently significantly more expensive to generate than electricity generated 
from coal without CCS and generally more expensive than electricity generated 
from gas. As can be seen in Table 3, even the least expensive generation from 
the least expensive type of RElec – on-shore wind – has a generation cost twice 
that of electricity generated from black coal in Australia: the most widely used 
fossil fuel used to generate electricity in the country. It should be noted that 
Table 3 does not specify the discount rate used to calculate the costs of 
electricity generation. A table by Diesendorf (2007 p. 355), using an 8% 
discount rate, finds typically higher cost estimates for wind and solar than in 
Table 3. Also, it is likely that the low end of the biomass costs in Table 3 
represents landfill gas, for which there is only small potential in Australia, and 
that the high end may be more typical. In November 2009, A$1 ≈ US$0.9.  
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Table 3: Comparison of generation costs of fossil fuel  
and RElec in 2006-07 
Fuel Generation 
cost: 
A$/MWh 
Brown coala 35 – 40
Black coala 30 – 35
Gas (combined cycle)a 38 – 54
Biomassa 46 – 80
Wind (on-shore)a 52 – 72
Geothermalb 70 – 110
Solar PVa 120+
Solar thermalc 120 – 150
Source:   
aPrime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading (2007: 197) , 
bMMA (2008 p. 18), cOwen (2007 p. 3-6). 
 
The gap between what RElec and non-RElec can be sold for, with 
reasonable profitability, is larger in Australia than it is in most other developed 
countries. This is because Australia has relatively low retail electricity prices 
while having an RElec generation cost structure roughly similar to that of other 
developed economies. The country’s low retail electricity prices have 
contributed to its economy being more electricity-intense than the OECD 
average since 1990 (IEA, 2009a). This has placed an upward pressure on its 
electricity generation GHG emissions. 
As shown in Figure 3, in the first quarter of 2007, out of a large number of 
developed countries surveyed by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2007 p. 
43), Australia had one of the lowest retail industrial electricity prices. Assuming 
similar mark-ups between wholesale and retail electricity prices in each country, 
and a roughly equivalent cost of RElec in each, means RElec in Australia faces a 
larger price disadvantage and therefore requires a more generous mechanism 
than that needed in most other developed economies to overcome its generation 
cost gap with non-RElec electricity. Residential retail electricity prices, typically 
A$120–170/MWh in 2009, are higher than industrial prices: this closes part of 
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the gap between the cost of residential retail electricity and the cost of 
residential photovoltaic electricity. 
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Figure 3: Electricity prices for industry in select OECD countries, first 
quarter 2007. 
Source: IEA (2007: 43) 
However, the generation cost disadvantage of RElec is likely to reduce 
over time because the cost of RElec is trending down while the cost of coal-fired 
electricity is trending up, though a small cost gap in Australia is not likely any 
time soon. According to researchers at the US Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory, the weighted average price of on-shore wind-generated electricity in 
the United States has reduced from US$63/MWh in 1999 (2007 dollars) to 
US$40/MWh in 2007 (Wiser and Bollinger, 2008 p. 16). Meanwhile, electricity 
prices in Australia have recently risen in real terms and that trend is likely to 
continue. Between 1980 and 1990 the electricity consumer price index increased 
by 3% in real terms when compared to the all-groups Australian consumer price 
index. It then increased by 6% in real terms between 1990 and 2000 then 
increased by 16% in real terms between 2000 and 2009 (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2009). After 2011, when emissions trading is proposed to commence 
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in the country, electricity prices will probably further increase because of their 
carbon cost component.  
 In Australia, there are two major types of mechanism that are either 
currently, or soon will be, available to help overcome the generation cost gap 
between RElec and fossil fuel-fired electricity: MRET/RET and GHG emissions 
trading. The original MRET mechanism operated in the country from 2001 until 
mid-2009, when it was rolled over into the new, expanded RET. There is now 
enough historic performance data about MRET to draw some conclusions about 
where RET can take RElec in Australia. Emissions trading, under Australia’s so-
called Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), is not due to commence in 
the country until July 2011, assuming its legislation is eventually passed (it was 
rejected by the country’s upper house of parliament in 2009). Treasury (2008) 
modelling of its impact, released in October 2008, gives an idea of the likely 
carbon price it will induce under different emission reduction scenarios. The 
federal government’s emissions trading White Paper, released in December 
2008, indicated what the short to medium term determinants of the scheme’s 
carbon price will be (DCC 2008b). Together they give some guidance about the 
part emissions trading can be expected to play in overcoming the RElec/coal-
fired generation cost gap. So we now have sufficient knowledge to discover 
approximately where RET and emissions trading are likely to take RElec in 
Australia in the short to medium term.  
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2.3 Advantages of a diversified ‘portfolio’ approach to RElec stimulation in 
Australia 
  To date Australia’s market has developed a narrow non-hydro RElec 
base, mostly comprising on-shore wind and some biomass (see section 3), that 
does not constitute a diversified RElec portfolio. There are two major 
disadvantages to the persistence of a narrow RElec base in the country: the first 
is that the number and amount of premium, low-cost wind and biomass sites and 
resource is limited and, eventually, their marginal costs will rise as these sites 
and resources are exhausted. In Germany, where high levels of RElec support 
have exhausted most good sites, higher marginal costs of wind generation are 
already being experienced (Junginger et al., 2005 p.142). The second 
disadvantage is that a narrow RElec base exposes Australia to greater insecurity 
of energy price and supply than a more diversified base would; a portfolio 
approach to RElec generation in Australia would reduce this exposure (Albrecht, 
2007; Awerbuch, 2006). It could also reduce the risk of Australian RElec being 
exposed to cost increases during a rapid scaling-up of capacity which was 
experienced in the US wind industry in 2007 (Bolinger and Wiser, 2008).  
 In Australia, estimates of the national long term low-to-medium cost 
on-shore wind resource range from 8 GW, with existing transmission capacity 
(Outhred, 2003 p. 3), which would supply about 5% of Australia’s predicted 
2030 electricity consumption, to 20% of its electrical energy in 2040 if the 
country’s transmission capacity is expanded (Diesendorf, 2007 p. 127). 
Australia’s off-shore wind potential is limited, based on current (non-floating) 
technology, because most of its coastal waters are deep and its population is 
concentrated in several cities located in areas of low to medium wind speed. 
Nevertheless, there are a few potential sites of interest  (Messali and Diesendorf, 
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2009). In general, to achieve a wind energy penetration of 20% while 
maintaining generation reliability, some limited back-up from additional peak-
load power plant may be required. In the unrealistic limiting case when all wind 
power is concentrated at a single site, required back-up capacity would be about 
half wind capacity (Martin and Diesendorf, 1982). However, with geographic 
dispersion of wind farms and an extended transmission system, additional back-
up would in general be a small fraction of wind capacity and in some cases may 
be unnecessary (USDoE, 2008).   
The extent of the country’s long-term biomass resource depends largely on 
the success, or otherwise, of the utilisation of agricultural waste, particularly 
stubble. It also depends on how significant transport is to its use. If significant 
amounts of agricultural waste can be utilised, the national long-term biomass 
generation could reach 72 TWh/y, equal to 18% of Australia’s projected 2030 
electricity generation (Clean Energy Council, 2008 p. 5), or even as much as 
30% during non-drought periods (Diesendorf, 2007 p. 151).  
It is theoretically possible, then, for wind and biomass together to supply 
about 25% to 40% of Australia’s 2030 electricity consumption, but the upper 
end of that supply would inevitably have a higher marginal cost than the 
premium resource supplied when both are first exploited. If a significant 
majority of Australia’s electricity is eventually generated by RElec, wind and 
biomass will not be able to supply all of the RElec generation. In contrast to this, 
the marginal cost of solar RElec, particularly solar-thermal electricity, is likely 
to decline as generation capacity expands (Neij, 2007 p. 2205) and solar thermal 
electricity has nowhere near the same resource constraints in Australia that wind 
and biomass have. There are huge areas of marginal land in inland Australia that 
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could be devoted to solar power, provided grid extensions are made. A 2006 
report published by the Cooperative Research Centre for Coal in Sustainable 
Development, estimated that an area measuring 35 km by 35 km located in a 
region of Australia with high solar radiance and low cloud cover could generate 
enough electricity to meet all of the country’s current electricity generation, if 
covered with a solar thermal electricity generation system (Wibberley et al., 
2006 appendix 1 p. 24). Australia’s projected 2030 electricity generation could 
be produced from this sized solar generator if 15% solar-to-electric efficiency 
was achieved and a 70% capacity factor was employed (requiring storage). 
Despite this potential, there is less than 150 MW of solar power capacity 
installed in the country (Clean Energy Council, 2009) compared to 3,000 MW in 
Spain and 5,000 MW in much less sunny Germany (Fouquet, 2009).  
On a similar scale of potential capacity, Geoscience Australia estimates 
one per cent of Australia’s hot rock geothermal resource could supply energy 
equivalent to 26,000 times the country’s annual consumption (Ferguson, 2008). 
The largest area of this resource extends from north-east South Australia to 
south-west Queensland. Once again, grid extensions will be needed to tap it.  
Unlike Europe (MacKay, 2009), Australia has a potential RElec resource 
well in excess of its current annual electricity consumption needs. It could even 
export renewable energy stored, for instance, in the form of hydrogen or 
methanol. If Australia’s RElec remains focused on wind and biomass alone, it 
risks both missing out on the long-term marginal cost reductions of solar and 
geothermal electricity and being increasingly exposed to the long-term marginal 
cost increases of wind and biomass. This will particularly be the case if very 
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deep cuts in Australia’s GHG emissions are eventually sourced from electricity 
generation.  
 One scenario for sourcing deep GHG emission cuts from Australia’s 
electricity generation consistent with a 450 ppm regime is shown in Figure 4. It 
shows about three-quarters of Australia’s electricity sourced from RElec by 
2050 with the balance sourced from coal generation using CCS (if it is 
commercially available). The RElec generation is mainly sourced from wind, 
solar thermal, solar photovoltaic and hot rock geothermal with minor 
contributions from biomass, hydro and wave. 
 
Figure 4: Australian electricity generation mix scenario consistent with a 
450 CO2e ppm regime 
Source: Graham and Wright (2009). 
3. The success and failure of the MRET in stimulating RElec 
 
3.1 Origins of the Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Australia was one of the first countries in the world to adopt the RPS 
mechanism which was originally developed in the United States. The 
mechanism’s big strengths are that, in theory, it delivers a pre-determined and 
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certain level of RElec generation and has an in-built incentive for electricity 
suppliers to source least-cost RElec. Its big disadvantages are that it has no in-
built incentive to purchase electricity from a wide range of RElec types and has 
no in-built structure that necessarily decreases the support given to RElec over 
time. 
3.2 The performance of the MRET mechanism  
3.2.1 Quantity of RElec generation in Australia under MRET 
Australia’s MRET was designed to increase the country’s level of RElec 
generation by 9.5 TWh/y between 2001 and 2010. When the mechanism 
commenced it was thought that, when combined with pre-existing RElec 
generation, it would lift the RElec share of the grid-connected electricity 
generation (which accounts for about 90% of all electricity generation in the 
country) from 10.5% to 12.5% by 2010. However, because of several factors 
including electricity consumption rising at a faster rate than anticipated, recent 
drought induced reductions in hydro-electric generation and the issuing of a 
significant number of RECs for technologies that do not generate RElec such as 
solar hot water heaters (see s5.3), it is unlikely RElec generation in Australia 
will have any greater a percentage share of national electricity generation in 
2010 than it had in 2001, despite MRET. However, MRET has been successful 
at arresting a long term decline in the proportion of Australia’s electricity 
generated by RElec. In the early 1960s nearly a quarter of the country’s 
electricity was generated by RElec; by the commencement of MRET only 8% 
was (Tambling, 2003 p. 11).  
As shown in Figure 5, from  2001 to 2006, the hydro and non-hydro RElec 
share of Australia’s electricity generation (both grid and off-grid) remained at its 
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MRET commencement level of about 8%. The only change over the period was 
a slight reduction in the proportion of RElec generated by hydro and a slight 
increase in the proportion generated by non-hydro RElec. 
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Figure 5: Hydro and non-hydro RElec market shares of Australia’s annual 
electricity generation: 2001 to 2006 
 
Source: ABARE (2004 to 2007 and 2009a). 
 
As shown in Table 4, RElec accounts for a smaller share of electricity 
generation in Australia than it does in Europe or the United States. However, the 
growth in Australia’s RElec generation between  2001 and 2006 was higher than 
for the European Union but lower than for the United States. Like the European 
Union, Australia’s RElec growth was adversely affected by a decline in hydro 
generation during between 2001 and 2006. However, Australia’s non-hydro 
RElec grew more rapidly during the period than it did in either the US or the EU 
but the growth occurred off a low non-hydro base. In 2001 non-hydro RElec 
only accounted for 0.5% of all electricity generation in Australia compared to 
1.9% in the US and 2.4% in the EU. Australia’s high RElec concentration index 
reflects the fact that its RElec is more dependent on hydro generation than RElec 
is in either the US or the EU.   
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Table 4: RElec indices for the United States, all EU countries and Australia, 
2001 and 2006. 
 
 2001 2006 2001/2006 change 
United States 
Electricity generation: TWh/y 3,737 4,064 +8.8% 
RElec generation: TWh/y 288 379 +31.6% 
RElec market share 7.7% 9.3% +20.8% 
Hydro generation: TWh/y 217 283 +30.4% 
Non-hydro RElec generation 71 96 +35.2% 
Non-hydro RElec market share 1.9% 2.4% +26.3% 
RElec concentration index 0.589 0.583 -1.0% 
European Union 27 
Electricity generation: TWh/y 3,113 3,357 +7.8% 
RElec generation: TWh/y 447 489 +9.4% 
RElec market share 14.4% 14.6% +1.4% 
Hydro generation: TWh/y 373 309 -17.2% 
Non-hydro RElec generation 74 180 +143.2% 
Non-hydro RElec market share 2.4% 5.4% +125% 
RElec concentration index 0.709 0.461 -35.0% 
Australia 
Electricity generation: TWh/y 218 247 +13.3% 
RElec generation: TWh/y 18 20 +11.1% 
RElec market share 8.2% 8.0% -2.4% 
Hydro generation: TWh/y 17 16 -5.9% 
Non-hydro RElec generation 1 4 +300% 
Non-hydro RElec market share 0.5% 1.5% +200% 
RElec concentration index 0.884 0.671 -24.1% 
Source: Energy Information Administration (2009), European Commission (2009) and ABARE (2004 to 2007 and 
2009a). 
 
3.2.2 RECs issued in Australia under MRET 
At first sight it seems MRET has been successful at stimulating a broad 
range of RElec types. As indicated in Figure 6, solar hot water, in addition to 
wind and biomass (mostly made up of landfill gas and sugar cane waste), are the 
non-hydro RElec sources that have been the major beneficiaries of the 
mechanism. But the significant level of solar hot water generation is not a 
product of MRET alone. It has also been stimulated by a range of federal, state 
and local government installation subsidies. Once this is factored in, Australia’s 
MRET has not performed that differently from RPS mechanisms in other 
countries that use it. In general, the mechanism has only succeeded in 
stimulating the least-cost RElec types of wind and biomass. The big losers from 
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MRET have been solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal electricity. Under 
MRET, tradable certificates – Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs: 1 MWh = 
1 REC) – are created by RElec generators which are purchased by electricity 
retailers to discharge their MRET obligation. Solar hot water heaters, in 
reducing demand for electricity, are also allowed to create RECs. Of the 
35,484,013 RECs created by the end of December 2008, only 1.4% had been 
created by solar energy other than solar hot water heaters (Office of the 
Renewable Energy Regulator, 2009b p. 19). 
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Figure 6: Valid RECs created under MRET, 1 April 2001 to 23 May 2009 
Source: Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator (2009a) 
 
Two ways of pursuing a diversified portfolio approach to RElec 
development, whilst using a RPS, are:  
• to use a high-volume feed-in tariff (a mechanism that guarantees above-market 
RElec prices) for more expensive RElec types (modern feed-in tariffs were 
originally developed in Germany, Denmark and Spain – see Meyer 2003, Meyer 
2007); or 
• to introduce long-term higher weights, or ‘bands’, within an RPS for the more 
expensive types (as commenced in the UK in April 2009) or to create special 
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sub-markets, or ‘carve outs’, for them within the RPS (as done in several US 
states).  
3.3 The contribution of the expanded RET to RElec in Australia 
During the 2007 national election, the Australian Labor Party promised to 
replace MRET with the expanded RET. The latter is a more ambitious RPS than 
MRET: it aims to lift the RElec contribution to about 20% of the country’s grid-
connected electricity by 2020 by generating an additional 45 TWh/y of RElec 
(including the MRET target) by 2020. After a delay of 18 months from the 2007 
federal election, the legislation for the expanded RET was passed and took force 
from 1 July 2009. In addition to the pre-MRET RElec generation, the RET and 
MRET will in theory bring total RElec generation in Australia to 60 TWh/y by 
2020, as detailed in Table 5. In addition to the Table 5 targets, RET will also 
include 0.85 TWh/y coal seam gas generation by 2020 but this is not a type of 
RElec. 
Table 5: Pre MRET, MRET and RET 2020 RElec target generation levels 
 
RElec mechanism RElec generation 
at 2020: TWh/y 
No mechanism: 
pre-MRET 
15 
MRET 9.5 
RET 35.5 
Total 60 
 
As shown in Table 6, the increase in the intended amount of RElec 
generation, to be driven by both MRET and the expanded RET between 2005 
and 2020, is predicted to be equal to about 45% of the projected electricity 
generation increase over the period. The current Australian government plans to 
phase out the expanded RET after 2030 by which time it claims its proposed 
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ETS – the CPRS – will be performing the same function in terms of bridging the 
cost gap between RElec and conventional coal-fired electricity generation.  
According to the CPRS White Paper: ‘The Government’s emissions 
reduction strategy has four foundation elements: the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme, the Renewable Energy Target, carbon capture and storage, and energy 
efficiency’ (DCC, 2008b p. 19-4). So the obvious question is: will the CPRS and 
expanded RET make a significant contribution to GHG emissions reduction by 
stimulating Australia’s RElec? 
Table 6: Contribution of MRET and expanded RET generation to 
projected increase in total Australian electricity generation between 2005 
and 2020 
Period Pre-MRET RElec 
generation with added 
MRET and expanded 
RET generation: TWh/y 
Actual and projected 
total Australian 
electricity generation: 
TWh/y 
2005 19.4 252 
2020 60 342 
Difference: 2005 to 
2020 
40.6 90 
Source: ABARE (2006: 29). 
 
4. The potential effectiveness of the CPRS in stimulating 
Australia’s RElec 
 
4.1 Treasury’s modelling of GHG reduction carbon prices 
The Australian Treasury department’s modelling of the economic impact 
of national GHG reduction focused on four different national GHG reduction 
scenarios where, compared to the country’s 2000 level of GHG emissions, 
reductions of 5%, 10%, 15% and 25% were made by 2020. However, the CPRS 
White Paper, published in December 2008, stipulated the maximum GHG 
emissions cut that would be made by Australia would be 15% by 2020, subject 
to major international actions, and that the ‘unconditional’ reduction would be 
5%. Subsequently, in May 2009, the Australian government increased the upper 
Design Limitations in Australian Renewable Electricity Policy  December 2009    p. 24. 
limit of the cuts to 25%, subject to conditions that, so far, have not been met 
(Wong, 2009a). When announcing the possible 25% cut, the Australian Prime 
Minister said it would only be enacted if ‘the world agrees to stabilise levels of 
CO2-e in the atmosphere at 450ppm or less by 2050’ (Wong 2009).  Since the 
December 2009 Copenhagen climate change meeting did not agree on measures 
that would necessarily limit GHG concentrations in this way, it is thought 
Australia is ultimately likely to commit to a 10% to 15% GHG emissions cut on 
2000 levels by 2020. In late January 2010, the Australian government submitted 
a 5% to 25% range of possible reductions as its commitment to the Copenhagen 
accord saying it would not pledge to cut by more than 5% until ‘the level of 
global ambition becomes sufficiently clear’ (Wong 2010).  The commencement 
and 2020 emissions trading scheme carbon prices that Treasury’s modelling 
found would be associated with the 5%, 15% and 25% scenarios are given in 
Table 7. (Treasury quoted its 2020 carbon prices in 2005 prices while its 
commencement carbon prices were quoted in nominal prices.) 
Table 7: Emissions trading carbon prices modelled by Australian Treasury. 
 
Year 5% GHG emission 
reduction by 2020 carbon 
price: A$/tCO2e 
15% GHG emission 
reduction by 2020 carbon 
price: A$/tCO2e 
25% GHG emission 
reduction by 2020 
carbon price: A$/tCO2e 
2010  A$23 A$32 A$52 
2020 A$35 A$50 A$60 
Source: Treasury (2008 p. 139). 
 
4.2 The impact of CPRS carbon prices on RElec stimulation 
Figure 7 takes the current RElec and non-RElec generation costs quoted in 
Table 3 then adds in Treasury’s 5%, 15% and 25% 2020 GHG reduction carbon 
prices, taking account of the carbon intensities of the non-RElec sources, to get 
an approximate idea of 2020 post carbon pricing generation cost relativities 
(though future generation costs will be subject to the different cost forces 
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mentioned in section 2.2). In Figure 7, the generation cost gap between the five 
different types of RElec, and that of electricity generated from black coal, 
remains significant except for wind and biomass. However, if Table 3 
underestimates the prices of wind and biomass, as Diesendorf’s (2007) Table 
B.2 suggests, then even most wind and biomass may be unable to benefit from 
the CPRS’s carbon prices. Furthermore, a carbon price of A$120/tCO2e, that is 
likely to be politically unacceptable, would be needed to stimulate the full cost 
range of all the RElec types (Treasury, 2008). Diesendorf (2007) estimates that 
even higher carbon prices would be needed to stimulate solar electricity, at least 
in the short-term. This suggests RElec in Australia is likely to be only 
marginally expanded by emissions trading by 2020, beyond that planned by 
MRET and the expanded RET. This is especially the case if RET reduces carbon 
prices in the short term. It also suggests that, unless carbon prices rise 
significantly after 2020 and remain consistently at high levels, they will not have 
the RElec stimulatory effect the government is anticipating they will have after 
that time. Carbon spot prices in the European ETS have fluctuated between €30 
and €0 per tonne CO2 over the period 2005–2007 (Alberola et al., 2008 fig.1), 
giving little confidence to potential investors in RElec.  
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Figure 7: 2020 electricity generation costs including Treasury CPRS 2020 
carbon prices 
 
On a the broader front of the CPRS’s general impact on the electricity 
sector, modelling quoted in the Australian government’s White Paper, which 
incorporated the CPRS and expanded RET, suggested their main combined 
impact would be on new electricity generation investment rather than existing 
investment (DCC, 2008b p. 13-16).  
4.3 Criticisms of the combined effect of emissions trading and the RET on 
RElec in Australia 
There has been criticism of the situation that emissions trading and the 
expanded RET may work side-by-side from 2011 until 2030 in Australia. Some 
argue that, together, the two mechanisms will concentrate too much of the 
country’s GHG reduction burden on the electricity sector, resulting in higher 
electricity prices than would exist under the CPRS alone (CRA International, 
2007 p. 18; Productivity Commission, 2008 p. 72). They also argue this 
concentration on electricity will have other undesirable outcomes including 
lower carbon prices than would exist if the expanded RET did not exist (CRA 
International, 2007 p. 13). Several large electricity users, most notably 
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aluminium smelters, have succeeded in obtaining exemptions from the 
electricity price increases resulting from the expanded RET.  
Whilst these criticisms have some validity in the short term, they ignore 
the longer term benefits of having a significant RElec base in Australia, 
especially its role in reducing its GHG emissions. It also needs to be 
remembered that the lower carbon prices generated by the two mechanisms 
working together will compensate for some of the higher cost of RElec. The 
expanded RET should help reduce the long-term generation costs of RElec by 
making economies of scale cost reductions available and by bringing forward 
other learning-by-doing cost reductions (that come through better approval 
processes, better finance practices, reductions in equipment costs etc) (MMA, 
2007 p. 5).  
 
5. The prospects of reaching the RElec generation target of the 
RET 
5.1 An optimistic scenario for Australia’s 2020 RElec 
In reaching the RElec goal of 60 TWh/y of RElec by 2020, the 
conventional view is that wind generation will increase to take up at least half of 
the 35.5 TWh/y difference between the MRET target (including pre-MRET 
RElec generation) and the 2020 expanded RET target (MMA, 2007 p. 6). To 
generate half the difference, the installed wind generating capacity in Australia 
will need to increase five-fold from the 2008 level of 1,306 MW to about 8,600 
MW (assuming a 30% capacity factor, which is typical for on-shore wind farms 
in Australia). Reaching this capacity will require a 17% compound rate of 
annual growth between 2008 and 2020. As can be seen from Table 8, this is 
below the rate of growth that wind generation achieved under MRET between 
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2001 and 2005 (from a very low base), and between 2007 and 2008, but is above 
what it achieved between 2006 and 2007.  
Table 8: Australian wind energy generation capacity 2001 to 2008 
 
Year Australian wind 
generating capacity: 
MW 
% capacity 
increase from 
previous year 
2001 73
2002 105 44%
2003 198 89%
2004 380 92%
2005 708 86%
2006 817 15%
2007 824 1%
2008 1,306 58% 
Source: Global Wind Energy Council (2008: 21 p. 2009). 
 
Beyond wind, most of the balance to reach the 2020 expanded RET target is expected 
to come from biomass and hot rock geothermal generation (Ernst and Young, 2008 p. 
5). At this stage, both the biomass and geothermal industries think they can deliver 
this balance. The biomass sector states it can generate 10.6 TWh/y of electricity by 
2020, which would be about 9.2 TWh/y more than it currently generates. It expects to 
generate most of its 2020 electricity from bagasse (sugarcane waste), wood waste and 
landfill gas from 1,845 MW of installed capacity: about 1,200 MW more capacity 
than it currently has (Clean Energy Council, 2008 p. 20). The geothermal sector 
currently generates no electricity for the Australian National Electricity Market, but 
believes it can have 1,000–2,200 MW of installed capacity by 2020 generating 7.7–17 
TWh/y of electricity (assuming a 90% capacity factor) (MMA, 2008a p. 1). However, 
modelling done for the federal government’s Treasury department, which assumed a 
25% cut in Australia’s GHG emissions by 2020 and continuation of MRET, 
considered that there would only be about 1,000 MW of geothermal capacity by 2020 
(MMA, 2008b p. 17). A recent report compiled for the Australian geothermal industry 
also conceded it may only have 1,000 MW capacity ready by 2020 (MMA, 2008a p. 
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20). So if wind capacity scales up by about 7,300 MW, biomass capacity increases by 
about 1,200 MW and geothermal by about 1,000 MW of capacity, the 2020 60 TWh/y 
target will be reached, roughly along the lines summarised in Table 9. However, 
Table 9 does not take account of RECs created by solar hot water heaters. Although 
they are currently a major creator of RECs, one prediction is that by 2020 they will 
only be responsible for about 8% of the RECs market (MMA, 2009 p. 36). However, 
their future RECs creation strongly depends on non-RET subsidy levels and 
regulations (see s5.3) and so 8% may be an underestimate (see section 5.3).  
Table 9: Scenario of increased RElec generation to reach 
2020 RET target of 60 TWh/y of RElec generation 
RElec source Yearly 
generation 
by 2020: 
TWh/y 
Pre-MRET RElec generation 15 
MRET generation 9.5 
Increased wind generation (from 
extra 7,300 MW capacity) 
19.2 
Increased biomass generation 
(from extra 1,200 MW capacity) 
8.4 
Geothermal generation (from an 
extra 1,000 MW capacity) 
7.9 
Total generation 60 
 
5.2 Australian RElec resource and technology limitations 
However, significant problems may be encountered in reaching the RElec 
generation levels in Table 9. Apart from the possible limitation of the inability 
of wind capacity to expand at the required rate, the expansion of biomass 
generation from sugarcane waste may be constrained by fluctuating global sugar 
prices as well as concerns about the ongoing viability of the sugar industry 
(Ernst and Young, 2008 p. 12). There are also concerns about the amount of 
transport fuel needed to collect biomass. The ability to source biomass 
electricity from wood waste is restricted by the fact that if it comes from native 
forest logging it cannot be used as an RElec source in most Australian states and 
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there is limited capacity to expand landfill gas generation in the country. In 
addition, drought could constrain the use of biomass residues from the wheat 
industry. 
The generation of geothermal electricity in Australia from hot rock 
technology has its own set of constraints: although there is a huge resource, the 
technology is in its infancy, is very capital intensive and therefore subject to the 
vagaries of the equity and debt markets, and will require the construction of long 
transmission lines to be able to feed into Australia’s National Electricity Market 
grid.  
5.3 Design limitations of the RET 
The resource and technology limitations mentioned in the previous 
subsection are not insurmountable barriers to significantly increased RElec 
generation in Australia. For instance, given appropriate government policies, a 
shortfall in generation from biomass or wind could be offset by an increase in 
geothermal and solar thermal generation. A far greater barrier to reaching the 
target of 20% RElec by 2020 is set up by some of the design features of the 
RET, which could exclude the lowest cost sources of RElec: wind and biomass. 
Under RET, solar and electric heat pump hot water technologies can 
produce RECs. Based on ‘conservative’ modelling, Saddler (2009) reports that 
25% of all RECs could be received by water heaters over the period from 2009–
2020. Based on trends in the former MRET mechanism, a government 
department finds that it is possible that 30%–35% of the medium-term increase 
in the target could be taken up by these water heating technologies, which 
already receive federal and state/territory subsidies (DEWHA, 2009). Between 1 
January 2009 and 13 November 2009, solar and electric heat pump hot water 
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technologies were responsible for 45% of all RECs created in Australia (Office 
of the Renewable Energy Regulator, 2009a). Their high level of RECs creation 
was prompted by a significant increase in February 2009 in the national 
government subsidy solar hot water heaters receive. Their RECs creation may 
fall after the subsidy reduces (by 2012), but the possible future phase-out of off-
peak electric water heating may keep the demand for solar and electric heat 
pump hot water heaters high. Unlike most versions of the RPS, both MRET and 
RET allow unlimited banking of RECs so the effect of a high volume of hot 
water heater and heat pump RECs coming to market may be felt long after the 
demand for them subsides. Arguably, the principal barrier to the rapid diffusion 
of solar hot water is the requirement of many local governments in Australia for 
planning permission for these systems, a process that can take weeks. This has 
the effect that, when an existing electric hot water system breaks down at the 
end of its life, householders tend to install another electric hot water system, 
since this can be done within one day. The solution is for state governments to 
ban the required planning permission for accredited solar water heaters 
(Diesendorf, 2007 p.155). Potentially an even worse RET design flaw is that 
more than half the increase in RET’s target, at least over the next five years, 
could be taken up by ‘phantom’ residential solar, wind or hydro systems. The 
flaw arises under the federal government’s Solar Credits scheme, which is a 
RECs multiplier scheme that initially awards five RECs per MWh to each small 
residential solar photovoltaic, wind or hydro system instead of the usual one 
REC/MWh (DCC, 2009a). The scheme’s level of RECs creation will fall after 
2015 when it finishes, although, like hot water heaters, RET’s allowance of 
unlimited banking of RECs may ensure the effect of the phantom RECs is felt 
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long after this date. The problem with the scheme’s RECs multiplier is that it 
counts all five RECs as contributing towards RET’s target, even though four of 
them do not represent real RElec generation. Because RET’s target is expressed 
as a number of generation hours, and not as a future market share (see below), 
the extra RECs created under the scheme erode its target. The federal 
government has given no justification for this extraordinary design feature. It 
means that, if residential solar electric systems contribute (say) 15% of the 
increase in target, they will actually be counted as fulfilling 75% of the target. 
When combined with the RECs earned by solar and heat pump hot water 
heaters, it is possible there will be little room in the expanded RET for extra 
wind or biomass generation, at least until 2015.  
The increase in the supply of solar and heat pump hot water RECs, 
together with the Solar Credits phantom RECs, puts a downward pressure on 
RECs prices. This thwarts wind generation, and the lower-cost forms of biomass 
generation, from competing with coal-fired electricity in Australia. Indeed, as 
shown in Figure 8, this has been the RECs price experience since early 2009 
when the solar hot water subsidy was increased. This resulted in major concern 
being expressed about the fall in RECs prices (Environment Victoria et al., 
2009; Parkinson, 2009; Wong, 2009b). 
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 Figure 8: Australian RECs prices: June 2003 to September 2009 
Source: Green Energy Markets (2009). 
Another influence that may work against RET producing RElec generation 
equal to 20% of Australia’s grid-connected electricity generation by 2020 is the 
rate of electricity generation growth in the country. Unlike RPS targets in other 
countries, the RET’s target is specified in TWh per year (see Table 5) and not an 
electricity percentage market share. In 2006-07, Australia’s grid-connected 
electricity generation was 227 TWh/y (ABARE,, 2009b p. 20). RET’s 60 
TWh/y-by-2020 target assumes annual generation will reach 300 TWh/y by 
2020. This projection implies an average compound rate of generation growth of 
2.1%/y between 2007 and 2020. Although this is in line with projections by 
ABARE, there is good reason to think actual growth may end up higher than 
this. Table 10 shows that the predicted 2.1% annual growth between 2007 and 
2020 is well below the average annual rate of growth since 1997-98 (3.3%). It is 
not inconceivable that the average annual rate of generation growth will fall to 
the predicted rate, but much will depend on the price of electricity (including 
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carbon pricing) and the effect it has on increasing electricity usage efficiency 
and decreasing demand growth. At the very least, RET’s TWh target needs 
periodic revision to ensure it remains consistent with RET’s 20%-by-2020 
target. 
Table 10: Grid-connected electricity generation  
in Australia, 1997-98 to 2006-07. 
Year Grid-
connected 
generation: 
TWh/y 
Increase on 
previous 
year 
1997-98 170  
1998-99 186 9.4% 
1999-2000 193 3.7% 
2000-01 199 3.1% 
2001-02 201 1.0% 
2002-03 206 2.5% 
2003-04 213 3.4% 
2004-05 217 1.9% 
2005-06 220 1.4% 
2006-07 227 3.2% 
Source: ABARE (2005 p. 39 and 2009b p. 20). 
 
Another design problem with RET is its reliance on high ongoing hydro 
generation in Australia. A quarter of RET’s TWh target is made up of hydro 
generation which the target assumes will remain at 15 TWh/y. However, 
because of recent drought conditions, hydro generation may fall below this 
level. If this happens, RET’s ability to reach 20% of Australia’s grid-connected 
electricity generation by 2020 will be further eroded. As shown in Table 11, 
although hydro generation in Australia was above 15 TWh/y between 2001 and 
2006 but below it in 2007, the forecast for future generation is not optimistic. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2009a part III p. 103) reports that in 
2008 total hydro generation in Australia was only 12.4 TWh/y. 
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Table 11: Hydro electricity generation in Australia, 2001 to 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Hydro generation: 
TWh/y 
2001 16.8 
2002 16.0 
2003 16.5 
2004 16.3 
2005 15.6 
2006 16.0 
2007 14.5 
Source: ABARE (2009a p. 33). 
 
On top of the aforementioned potential hurdles, the feed-in tariffs so far 
announced by Australia’s state and territory governments are unlikely to 
significantly augment the amount of RElec induced by the RET. This is because 
all the feed-in tariffs schemes, with the exception of the Australian Capital 
Territory’s (ACT) one, are only aimed at small generators of solar photovoltaic 
electricity. Also, they only create a modest incentive because they are generally 
based on the net amount RElec generators feed into the grid, not the gross 
amount (with the exception of ones in New South Wales and the ACT).  
Even if the above mentioned design flaws are removed from the expanded RET– 
with the result that wind, biomass and hot rock geothermal manage to deliver 
the extra RElec generation required to reach the 20% target – solar electricity 
will remain a marginal player in Australia’s RElec generation because of its 
current high generation cost. Without a mechanism to stimulate large solar 
power stations, the country will still have a narrow spectrum of RElec sources 
from which major cuts in its GHG emissions might one day be delivered. Either 
a relaxation of the restrictions on the feed-in tariffs, specific bands in the 
expanded RET, large government capital subsidies or tax deductions are needed 
for large-scale solar generation to significantly expand in Australia. In addition, 
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a strengthening and expansion of the country’s transmission network is required 
for RElec generated in remote locations to expand. 
 
6. Conclusions about the future of renewable energy electricity 
in Australia 
 
This paper leads to two broad conclusions about the future of RElec in 
Australia. The first is that the 45 TWh/y MRET/RET 2020 target is unlikely to 
be reached, for two reasons. Firstly, wind, biomass and hot rock geothermal 
generation may not be able to expand fast enough to reach it. This is unlikely to 
be a problem if effective government policies are enacted to bridge the price 
gaps between these sources and conventional coal-fired electricity. Secondly, a 
substantial barrier is that most of the increase in the target is likely to be taken 
up by RECs created by solar and heat pump hot water as well as by ‘phantom’ 
residential RElec systems, with the result that their prices will remain low, at 
least until 2015. The negative effect of these design flaws will have on the 
attainment of RET’s target may be made worse by low hydro generation and by 
higher-than-predicted growth in grid-connected electricity generation. Also, it is 
very unlikely that either the CPRS, or state and territory feed-in tariffs, will 
stimulate much RElec in addition to that stimulated by MRET and the expanded 
RET, before 2020 at the earliest. 
The second broad conclusion is that, with continued use of the 
MRET/RET mechanisms to stimulate most of the nation’s RElec, it is unlikely 
Australia will develop a broad enough RElec base from which it could one day 
make deep cuts in its GHG emissions. In their present forms, the expanded RET, 
and the CPRS cannot be relied upon to push the RElec industry into large 
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quantities of generation sufficient be able to deliver deep cuts in Australia’s 
GHG emissions at least until 2020. 
 
Acknowledgement 
The authors acknowledge the generous advice of Jack Pezzey, Senior Fellow at 
the Australian National University’s Fenner School of Environment and Society, 
in the preparation of this article. This research received support from the 
Australian Government’s Environment Research Facilities Program. 
 
References 
 
Alberola, E., Chevallier, J., Chèze, B., 2008. Price drivers and structural breaks in European 
caron prices 2005–2007. Energy Policy, 36, 787–797. 
  
Albrecht, J., 2007. The future of photovoltaics: a learning curve versus portfolio approach. 
Energy Policy, 35, 2296–2304. 
 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), 2004 to 2007. Australian 
Energy: National and State Projections to 2019-20/ Australian Energy: National and State 
Projections to 2029-30. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canberra. 
 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), 2005. Energy in 
Australia 2005. Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Canberra. 
 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), 2009a. Gross Electricity 
Production. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canberra. 
 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), 2009b. Energy in 
Australia 2009. Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Canberra. 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009. Consumer Price Index, Australia, June 2009. Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Canberra. 
 
Awerbuch, S., 2006. Portfolio-based electricity generation planning: policy implications for 
renewables and energy security. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 11, 
693–710.  
 
Bolinger, M., Wiser, R., 2008. Wind power price trends in the United States: struggling to 
remain competitive in the face of strong growth. Energy Policy, 37, 1061–1071.  
 
Clean Energy Council, 2008. Australian Bioenergy Roadmap: Setting the Direction for Biomass 
in Stationary Energy to 2020 and Beyond. Clean Energy Council, Melbourne. 
Clean Energy Council, 2009. Solar PV. Clean Energy Council, Melbourne.  
 
CRA International, 2007. Implications of a 20 per cent Renewable Energy Target for Electricity 
Generation. Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association Limited, Canberra.  
Design Limitations in Australian Renewable Electricity Policy  December 2009    p. 38. 
 
de Vries, B., van Vuuren, D., Hoogwijk, M., 2007. Renewable energy resources: their global 
potential for the first-half of the 21st Century at a global level: an integrated approach. Energy 
Policy, 35, 2590–2610.  
 
Department of Climate Change (DCC), 2008a. Stationary Energy Sector Greenhouse Gas 
Projections 2007. Department of Climate Change, Canberra.  
 
Department of Climate Change (DCC), 2008b. Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Australia’s 
Low Pollution Future: White Paper Volumes 1 and 2 December 2008. Department of Climate 
Change, Canberra. 
 
Department of Climate Change (DCC), 2009a. Solar Credits FAQ. Department of Climate 
Change, Canberra.  
 
Department of Climate Change (DCC), 2009b. National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 2007: 
Accounting for the Kyoto Target. Department of Climate Change, Canberra.  
 
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA), 2009. Solar Hot 
Water Rebate. Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Canberra.  
 
Diesendorf, M., 2007. Greenhouse Solutions With Sustainable Energy. UNSW Press, Sydney. 
 
Energy Information Administration, 2009. Official Statistics from the US Government: 
Electricity. Department of Energy, Washington DC.  
 
Environment Victoria, Alternative Technology Association, Moreland Energy Foundation, 2009. 
Improving the RET and CPRS: Suggested amendments to draft legislation. Environment 
Victoria, Melbourne. 
  
Ernst and Young, 2008. 20-20 Vision: Investment Challenges and Opportunities Arising from 
Australia’s 20% Renewable Energy Target. Ernst and Young, Canberra.  
 
European Commission, 2007. DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry. European 
Commission Directorate-General for Competition, Brussels. 
 
European Commission, 2009. EU Energy in Figures 2009: Electricity Generation from 
Renewables, Extended Time Series. European Commission Directorate-General for Energy and 
Transport, Brussels.  
 
Ferguson, M.(Minister for Resources, Energy and Tourism), 2008. The Vast Potential of 
Australia’s Geothermal Resources (press release, 16th September 2008). Australian Government, 
Canberra.  
Fouquet, D., (ed) 2009. Prices for Renewable Energies in Europe: Report 2009. European 
Renewable Energies Federation, Brussels. 
 
Garnaut, R., 2008. The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report. Cambridge University 
Press, Melbourne.  
 
Global Wind Energy Council, 2008. Global Wind 2007 Report. Global Wind Energy Council, 
Brussels. 
 
Graham, P., Wright, J., 2009.  The Contribution of Renewables in Australia's Future Energy 
Mix: Garnaut-25/450ppm Results. Lecture to the Australian Academy of Science, Canberra, on 
4 August 2009. 
 
Green Energy Markets, 2009. Spot REC Prices (End Month). Green Energy Markets, 
Melbourne. 
 
Design Limitations in Australian Renewable Electricity Policy  December 2009    p. 39. 
Hansen, J., Sato, M., Kharecha, P. et al. 2008. Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should 
Humanity Aim? The Open Atmospheric Science Journal 2:217–231. 
 
Hoogwijk, M., de Vries, B., Turkenburg, W., 2004. Assessment of the global and regional 
geographic, technical and economic potential of onshore wind energy. Energy Policy, 26, 889–
919. 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007. Contribution of Working Group III 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Summary 
for Policymakers. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva.  
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2007. Key World Energy Statistics. International Energy 
Agency, Paris.  
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2009a. Electricity Information 2009. International Energy 
Agency, Paris. 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2009b. Statistics: Electricity/Heat. International Energy 
Agency, Paris. 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA). Energy Statatistics Webpages 
<www.iea.org/stats/index.asp> accessed 27-1-2010. 
 
Jensen, S., Skytte, K., 2003. Simultaneous attainment of energy goals by means of green 
certificates and emission permits. Energy Policy, 31, 63–71.  
 
Junginger, M., Faaj, A., Turkenburg, W., 2005. Global experience curves for wind farms. 
Energy Policy, 33, 133–150.  
 
Linares, P., Santos, F., Ventosa, M., 2008. Coordination of carbon reduction and renewable 
energy policies. Climate Policy, 8, 377–394.  
 
MacKay, D.J.C. 2009. Renewable Energy – without the hot air. UIT Cambridge. 
 
McLennan Magasanik Associates (MMA), 2007. Increasing Australia’s Low Emission 
Electricity Generation – An Analysis of Emissions Trading and a Complementary Measure. 
Renewable Energy Generators Australia, Melbourne.  
 
McLennan Magasanik Associates (MMA), 2008a. Installed Capacity and Generation from 
Geothermal Sources by 2020. Australian Geothermal Energy Association, Adelaide.  
 
McLennan, Magasanik Associates (MMA), 2008b. Detailed Results of the Modelling of the 
Impacts of Emissions Trading on Electricity Markets. Treasury Department, Canberra. 
 
Markowitz, Harry, 1959. Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investment. John 
Wiley and Sons, New York. 
Martin, B., Diesendorf, M. 1982. Optimal mix in electricity grids containing wind power. 4 
(3),155–161.  
 
Messali, E., Diesendorf, M., 2009. Potential sites for off-shore wind power in Australia. Wind 
Engineering 33(4), 335–348. 
 
Meyer, Niels (2003). European Schemes for Promoting Renewables in Liberalised Markets. 
Energy Policy, 31, 665-676. 
 
Meyer, Niels (2007). Learning form Wind Energy Policy in the EU: Lessons from Denmark, 
Sweden and Spain. European Environment, 17, 347-362. 
 
McLennan, Magasanik Associates (MMA), 2009. Benefits and Costs of the Expanded 
Renewable Energy Target. Department of Climate Change, Canberra.  
Design Limitations in Australian Renewable Electricity Policy  December 2009    p. 40. 
 
Morthorst, P., 2001. Interactions of a tradable green certificate market with a tradable permits 
market. Energy Policy, 29, 345–353. 
 
Neij, L., 2008. Cost development of future technologies for power generation  a study based on 
experience curves and complementary bottom-up assessments. Energy Policy, 36, 2200–2211. 
 
Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator, 2002 to 2008. Annual Report 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007. Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator, Canberra. 
 
Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator, 2009a. The Register of Renewable Energy 
Certificates. Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator, Canberra.  
 
Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator, 2009b. Increasing Australia’s Renewable Energy 
Generation: Annual Report 2008. Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator, Canberra. 
 
Outhred, H., 2003. National Wind Power Study: An Estimate of Readily Accepted Wind Energy 
in the National Electricity Market. Australian Greenhouse Office, Canberra.  
 
Owen, A., 2007. Inquiry Into Electricity Supply in NSW: Chapter 3, Technology Options. 
Government of New South Wales, Sydney. 
 
Parkinson, G., 2009. Green Currency Takes a Tumble (article). The Australian, 13.7.09  
 
Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, 2007. Report of the Task Group on 
Emissions Trading. Australian Government, Canberra. 
 
Productivity Commission, 2008. What Role for Policies to Supplement an Emissions Trading 
Scheme?. Submission to the Garnaut Climate Change Review. Productivity Commission, 
Canberra. 
 
Rabl, A., Spadaro, J. 2000, Public health impact of air pollution and implications for the energy 
system. Annual Reviews of Energy and the Environment 25:601-27. 
 
Saddler, H., 2009. Australian policy in hot water. Ecogeneration, issue 55, 56–57. 
 
United States Department of Energy (USDoE), 2008. 20% Wind Energy by 2030: Increasing 
wind energy’s contribution to the US electricity supply. DOE/GO-102008-2567, May. 
 
Tambling, G., Stevens, N., Oliphant, M., Laver, P., 2003. Renewable Opportunities: A Review 
of the Operation of the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000. Australian Greenhouse Office, 
Canberra.  
 
Treasury Department, 2008. Australia’s Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate 
Change Mitigation. Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.  
 
Wibberley, L., Cottrell, A., Palfreyman, D., Scaife, P., 2006. Techno-Economics Assessment of 
Power Generation Options for Australia. Cooperative Research Centre for Coal in Sustainable 
Development, Pullenvale.  
 
Wiser, R., Bollinger, M., 2008. Annual Report on US Wind Power Installation, Cost, and 
Performance Trends: 2007. US Department of Energy, Washington DC. 
 
Wong, P. (Minister for Climate Change), 2009a. New Measures for the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme (press release, 4th May 2009). Australian Government, Canberra.  
 
Wong, P. (Minister for Climate Change), 2009b. COAG to Consider Renewable Energy 
Certificate Market (press release, 5th November 2009). Australian Government, Canberra.  
 
Design Limitations in Australian Renewable Electricity Policy  December 2009    p. 41. 
Wong, P. (Minister for Climate Change), 2010. Australia’s Submission to Copenhagen Accord 
(press release, 7th January 2010). Australian Government, Canberra.  
 
World Resources Institute (WRI), 2009. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool. World Resources 
Institute, Washington DC.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Design Limitations in Australian Renewable Electricity Policy  December 2009    p. 42. 
